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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has long been a promising area for
application of quantum effects toward solving real-world problems. But two major
obstacles have stood in the way of widespread applications: low secure key generation
rates and short achievable operating distances. In this paper, a new physical
mechanism for dealing with the first of these problems is proposed: interplay between
different degrees of freedom in a hyperentangled system (parametric down conversion)
is used to increase the Hilbert space dimension available for key generation while
maintaining security. Polarization-based Bell tests provide security checking, while
orbital angular momentum (OAM) and total angular momentum (TAM) provide higher
key generation rate. Whether to measure TAM or OAM is decided randomly on
each trial. The concurrent non-commutativity of TAM with OAM and polarization
provides the physical basis for quantum security. TAM measurements link polarization
to OAM, so that if the legitimate participants measure OAM while the eavesdropper
measures TAM (or vice-versa), then polarization entanglement is lost, revealing
the eavesdropper. In contrast to other OAM-based QKD methods, complex active
switching between OAM bases is not required; instead, passive switching by beam
splitters combined with much simpler active switching between polarization bases
makes implementation at high OAM more practical.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Ac,42.50.Ex
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1. Introduction
1.1. Quantum key distribution
In quantum key distribution (QKD) two experimenters (Alice and Bob) generate a
shared cryptographic key, using quantum mechanics to guarantee that an eavesdropper
(Eve) cannot obtain significant information about the key without being revealed.
Commonly, for optical QKD schemes, key bits are derived from photon polarization.
This can be done by having Alice prepare for Bob a single photon in a randomly
chosen polarization state known only to her (BB84 protocol [1]), or by Alice and Bob
each receiving from a common source half of an entangled photon pair (Ekert protocol
[2]). Either way, polarization measurements by Eve produce detectable disturbances.
Each photon is prepared in one of two non-orthogonal, mutually unbiased bases. Eve,
intercepting a photon traveling to Bob, must guess which basis to measure in; if
she measures in the same basis as the two legitimate participants, she acquires full
information without detection. However, half the time she guesses the wrong basis,
ensuring that her outcome is uncorrelated with Alice’s; she then obtains no useful
information and simultaneously exposes herself to detection by randomizing Bob’s
results. This occurs because the polarization operators in the two non-orthogonal bases
are not mutually commuting. Exchanging results for a subset of measurements, Alice
and Bob see the decrease in correlation between their polarizations, revealing Eve’s
actions. For fiber systems, phase is often used instead of polarization, but principle
remains the same.
There have been two principal obstacles to widespread application of QKD outside
of research labs. First, most methods have been limited in the distances over which they
can operate; the simplest single-photon or weak coherent state approaches, for example,
are generally limited to tens of kilometers before photon losses introduce unacceptable
levels of error.
Second, most approaches to QKD with optical systems have used polarization or
phase as the variables from which cryptographic key segments are generated. However,
polarization can normally only encode one qubit per photon, unless substantial extra
complications to the apparatus are added to allow for qutrit or ququart exploitation.
Similarly, it is difficult at a practical level to increase the number of dimensions of the
states encoded by phase beyond two, or at most, four. It would therefore be desirable
to find a more practical means of encoding high dimensional states into a photon. This
would increase the rate of key generation by allowing more than one bit of cryptographic
key to be shared between the legitimate users of the system per exchanged photon.
As a means of increasing the key rate, there has been much interest (see [3, 4, 5, 6]
and references therein) in using the photon’s orbital angular momentum (OAM) instead
of polarization. The range of applications of states with OAM, such as Laguerre-Gauss
states, to both classical and quantum communication has been rapidly expanding; see
for example [7, 8]. OAM is quantized, Lz = lz~, with integer topological charge lz.
There is no fundamental upper limit to the value of lz, so the alphabet size or effective
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Hilbert space dimension, N , is in principle unbounded. Using a range of lz values from
−l0 to +l0, each photon can generate up to log2N = log2(2l0 +1) bits of cryptographic
key. OAM was first successfully used [3] to generate a quantum key by means of the
three-dimensional qutrit space spanned by lz = 0,±1. However, switching between
unbiased, non-commuting bases in a higher-dimensional OAM space is now needed. This
basis switching is much more difficult for OAM than for polarization and the difficulty
grows with increasing basis size. Therefore the apparatus complexity and experimental
difficulty increase rapidly with growing N .
In this paper, we wish to propose a means for increasing the number of secret key
bits generated per transmitted photon, while avoiding the increasingly difficult basis
modulations required by other schemes when going to higher Hilbert space dimensions.
In the next section, we introduce a new physical mechanism for key generation that
will allow a simpler experimental route to this goal. The approach we propose makes
use of OAM for increased Hilbert space dimension, but here the OAM is employed in
a fundamentally different manner than in all previous methods. In particular, we will
make use of its joint entanglement with polarization, arranging the setup in such a
way that the polarization is able to serve as a signal of attempts at eavesdropping on
the OAM. Conceptually, rather than switching between two nonorthogonal bases in the
space of orbital angular momentum, we switch between two nonorthogonal bases in the
larger space of total angular momentum. This is much easier to accomplish because
only the measurement basis of the photon polarization needs to be actively modulated.
1.2. Quantum Nondemolition Measurements
The idea of using OAM to generate a secret key while only doing security-enforcing basis
modulations in polarization seems to have an immediate problem. The two variables
commute, so that one may be measured without disturbing the other. For example, the
OAM eigenvalue, lz, may be obtained by performing an ideal quantum nondemolition
(QND) measurement [9, 10, 11, 12]. This in principal causes no disturbance to the
polarization or spin.
In practice, the situation is a little more complicated. Practical execution of QND
requires nonlinear optical processes such as Kerr nonlinearity; but it has been shown
that the physics of nonlinear interaction ensures that QND measurement of OAM will
cause some disturbance to the signal’s polarization state [13]. This both reveals Eve’s
presence and destroys the information she was attempting to obtain, since it prevents
Alice and Bob from agreeing reliably on a shifted key. Furthermore, the low amplitudes
of nonlinear processes guarantee low efficiency at the single photon level; only a small
fraction of the photons will participate in the interaction, allowing Eve to determine
only a small fraction of the OAM values.
But these considerations are specific to the case of QND measurements via Kerr
nonlinearities. It may be possible that Eve has an advanced technology that allows
her to make QND measurements of lz by some other, as yet unknown, means. There
High Capacity Quantum Key Distribution 4
is no fundamental principal, to our knowledge, that guarantees that other such QND
technologies must cause a similar disturbance to polarization when applied to OAM.
Thus, we wish to avoid this problem by arranging a fundamental linkage between the
polarization and OAM that will cause QND measurements of one variable to disturb
the other, independent of the physical mechanism used to make the measurement. We
propose a means of accomplishing this in the following sections.
1.3. Hyperentangled QKD
We propose a high-dimensional OAM-based QKD scheme that requires no random
switching between OAM bases. For full security, it is necessary to treat both variables,
polarization and OAM, in a fully quantum manner. The goal is to do this in such a
way that active basis modulations are only needed in polarization, not in OAM. This is
achieved by adding a third variable, the total angular momentum (TAM) Jˆ about the
propagation axis, and then allowing a random choice between measuring Jˆz = Lˆz+Sˆz or
measuring Lˆz. Jˆ provides a linkage between the spin Sˆ (which determines the circular
polarization state) and the OAM Lˆ, that allows the desired goal to be achieved.
The principal idea is to separate key generation and security into different degrees of
freedom; however these variables must be closely linked in such a way that unauthorized
measurements of one variable produce detectable signatures in the other. We will
use OAM and TAM in tandem for key generation (due to their high dimensionality
and subsequently high key-generation capacity), while employing polarization for
security checks (due to the ease of alternating between polarization bases). This is
possible because spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) supplies photon
pairs hyperentangled [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] in polarization and OAM (among other
variables). Hyperentanglement in SPDC has found applications in recent years ranging
from quantum interferometry [15] and quantum imaging [20] to quantum cryptography
and dense coding [21, 22]. Polarization-OAM hyperentangled states have also been used
for ultra-sensitive angular measurements [23].
Previous uses of OAM in conjunction with polarization for QKD applications
[21, 22] make use of the two variables in a sort of parallel, non-overlapping manner:
the measurement of one variable has no effect on the other. The components of the two
variables are simply appended to each other to form a vector with more components,
thereby expanding the relevant state space to higher dimension. A complicated
procedure of basis switching must still be carried out in this higher-dimensional space
in order to ensure security. In contrast, in the current paper hyperentanglement is used
in a more intrinsic manner; the pair of entangled variables are partially overlapping in
the sense that they can be either independent or perfectly correlated with each other,
depending on whether or not a third variable has also been measured. In this way,
measurements by the eavesdropper on one variable become apparent through loss of
entanglement in a second variable due to the pairwise noncommutativity of the first two
variables with the third. The enforcement of security measures is then greatly simplified
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at high dimensions, since passive switching between the two measurement variables is
technically much simpler than active switching between large basis sets for a single
variable.
In addition to the technical simplification of QKD at high dimensions, the proposed
procedure is interesting for several other reasons. Use of the noncommutativity of Jˆ
with Lˆ and Sˆ for quantum communication applications seems to be largely unexplored,
as is the use in QKD of pairs of different vector operators in place of pairs of different
components of the same vector operator. Further, the use of angular momentum erasure
(see section (2)) to maintain polarization entanglement has not previously been proposed
and may be interesting in its own right as the basis for angular-momentum-based analogs
of quantum eraser and delayed choice experiments.
The proposed approach relies on the fact that although OAM and polarization
commute with each other, neither of them commutes with the TAM. To be explicit, the
commutators of Lˆ and Sˆ among themselves are given by:[
Lˆi, Lˆj
]
= i
∑
k
ǫijk~Lk (1)
[
Sˆi, Sˆj
]
= i
∑
k
ǫijk~Sk (2)
[
Lˆi, Sˆj
]
= 0, (3)
so that: [
Lˆi, Jˆj
]
=
[
Lˆi, Lˆj + Sj
]
=
[
Lˆi, Lˆj
]
+
✟
✟
✟
✟
[
Lˆi, Sˆj
]
(4)
= i
∑
k
ǫijk~Lk (5)
[
Sˆi, Jˆj
]
=
[
Sˆi, Lˆj + Sj
]
=
✟
✟
✟
✟
[
Sˆi, Lˆj
]
+
[
Sˆi, Sˆj
]
(6)
= i
∑
k
ǫijk~Sk, . (7)
This lack of commutativity means that TAM measurements provide an indirect linkage
between Lˆ and Sˆ, ; we make use of this linkage in the following.
The specific procedure to be proposed in the next section allows Alice and Bob
a random choice between measuring the eigenvalues of either the OAM (Lˆz) or the
TAM, (Jˆz). Only trials on which Alice and Bob both measure the same variable are
kept; on these, the photon spin (polarization) state remains entangled. If Eve measures
a variable different than Alice and Bob did, the spin wavefunction collapses into a
definite polarization state, which will be detectable by a Bell-type test on polarization.
This occurs because once the values of Lˆz and Jˆz have both been measured, the value of
Sˆz = Jˆz−Lˆz can be determined as well. Subsequent measurements of the photon’s linear
polarization in the x− y plane will then be affected by this sequence of measurements.
The higher dimension of the OAM state space increases the number of key bits
generated per photon; this is done without any additional active modulation beyond
what is needed in the usual polarization-based protocols. There is no upper limit to the
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Figure 1. Each participant randomly measures either Lˆz or Jˆz via nondestructive
sorting. After sorting is done in one of these variables, the information about the other
variable is erased (see figure 2). Regardless of which variable is sorted and which is
erased, the polarization is undisturbed and available for measurement.
number of bits possible in principle, although there are of course practical limits. N can
potentially be scaled up to very large size with little additional effort as long as sources
with high values of entangled angular momenta and OAM sorters that work over a large
enough range are both available. The range of achievable l values for entangled photons
has rapidly grown in recent years [24, 25]. Measures must be taken to guarantee that
the range being used for the alphabet has a flat spectrum; otherwise Eve can use the
differing probabilities to gain information about the key. This equalization, however,
can be easily achieved, for example by using extra OAM sorters followed by filters with
different transmission rates. The span of values that can be sorted by a single sorter
has also grown, though more slowly [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
2. Setup and Procedure
2.1. The Setup
Figure 1 shows the proposed setup in schematic form, with more detailed view of portions
of it in figures 2 and 4. We will assume that the down conversion source uses a pump
beam with zero OAM. The signal and idler polarizations are perfectly correlated for
type I down conversion or perfectly anticorrelated for type II; either way, the OAM is
perfectly anticorrelated. For specificity, we henceforth assume type II down conversion.
The particular case drawn in figures 2 and 4 assumes alphabet size N = 3 (l = 0,±1;
i.e. l0 = 1), so an array of three detectors is required following each sorter. Larger
alphabets require more detectors, sorters, and erasure stages, but no further changes
are needed; the setup complexity therefore grows much more slowly with alphabet size
than in other approaches; a change of OAM bases in the approach of [3], for example,
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Figure 2. The procedures for erasing Lˆz information (top) following a Jˆz
measurement, or erasing Jˆz information (bottom) after an Lˆz measurement. In the
top case, the value of Jˆz can still be determined from which of an array of detectors
fires at the end (see figure 4), and similarly for Lˆz in the bottom case. The figure
is drawn for incoming value of l or j equal to 1, but the process works the same way
for other values. In each case, the undesired values are sorted, shifted to zero, then
recombined so there is no way to determine what the original value was. The shifting
is further illustrated in figure 3.
requires the alignment and coordination of rapidly increasing numbers of moving stages
as the dimension grows. (Note that even though the alphabet being used is {−1, 0,+1},
the sorters will need to be capable of sorting values up to ±2 to carry out the erasure
procedure in figure 2.)
Alice and Bob can readily measure either OAM eigenvalue lz or spin eigenvalue
sz (circular polarization), or both. In the paraxial case, Sˆ and Lˆ are well-defined
and commute, so their components can be simultaneously measured, as verified
experimentally in [33]. This fully determined jz. In contrast, the TAM jz about the
propagation axis can be measured interferometrically in such a way [33] that it leaves
the separate values of both spin and OAM undetermined. So suppose that Alice and Bob
each have a beam splitter randomly sending incoming photons either to an apparatus
that measures Lˆz or to one measuring Jˆz (the sorters in figure 1). After the sorting is
done on one variable, information about the other variable is erased by an arrangement
of beam splitters, waveplates, and holograms (see figures 2, 3, and 4). The sorting
by lz and jz values is nondestructive, so the spin or polarization can still be measured
afterwards.
2.2. Erasing unmeasured variables
The erasure of the unmeasured variable, as illustrated in figure 2, is necessary because
otherwise there will be no interference between polarization states. To see this, imagine
Alice and Bob place linear polarizers at respective angles θA and θB from the horizontal.
The states passed by the polarizers will be denoted |θA〉 and |θB〉. After passing
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Δl = +2
Δl = -2
l = +2
l= -2
l = 0
l = 0
(a)
Δs = +2
Δs = -2
s = +1
s = -1
s = -1
s = +1
(b)
Figure 3. The effect of the l and s shifters of figure 2. (a) The shifting of l in
the top part of figure 2 can be accomplished with a computer-generated hologram or
a spiral phase plate. The incoming waves of positive or negative OAM are converted
into plane waves with lz = 0. (b) The shift of s in the bottom part of figure 2 may be
carried out with birefringent phase plates. Left- and right-circularly polarized waves
are interchanged. Although this will alter the value of s, it will leave the spin or
polarization entanglement undisturbed on trials where both participants measure Jˆz ,
since they will both carry out similar spin flips in opposite directions.
through the polarizers, the probability of joint detection in both labs is proportional
to |〈θA|〈θB|ψ〉|2. Provided the angles are not multiples of pi2 , both |H〉 and |V 〉 will
have nonzero projections onto the |θ〉 states, so that cross-terms between the H and V
pieces will survive in the probability. These cross terms will be dependent on θA and θB,
giving rise to the desired Bell interference. However if the polarization is entangled with
another variable (OAM for example), a state such as |l1, H〉A|l2, V 〉B ± |l2, V 〉A|l1, H〉B
will produce no interference, since the Lˆz eigenstates |l1〉 and |l2〉 will still be orthogonal
after the polarizer, causing the cross terms to vanish; there are no intermediate states to
bridge the two orthogonal OAM states in the way that the |θ〉 states did for polarization.
This can be seen in detail in the example given below (section 2.4).
When jz has been measured, information about lz can be erased (top part of figure
2) by sorting different lz values into different paths, inserting appropriate holograms or
spiral phase plates to shift the OAM in each path to zero, then recombining the paths. In
this manner, the initial OAM values are erased (shifted to zero) so that there is no way
of determining which path was taken and what the initial OAM value was. The different
incoming OAM states are now indistinguishable, while the polarization states are left
entangled. Similarly, when lz is measured information about jz can be erased (bottom
part of figure 2) by sorting jz values, shifting the values of sz appropriately with phase
plates (converting one circular polarization into the other), and recombining. Although
this changes the value of s for each photon, it leaves the entanglement undisturbed on
the trials where both Alice and Bob measure jz, since they both carry out similar shifts:
an incoming entangled spin state of the form |sz = 1〉A|sz = −1〉B±|sz = −1〉A|sz = 1〉B
is shifted to |sz = −1〉A|sz = +1〉B±|sz = +1〉A|sz = −1〉B, which is still entangled and
in fact proportional to the original state.
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2.3. Procedure
Consider now the setup described in the previous section with a two-photon input state
generated from type II parametric down conversion. The pump beam is assumed to
have no OAM, lpump = 0. Alice and Bob each receive one photon from the state, on
which to make measurements. Consider several possibilities:
• Suppose Alice and Bob both measure lz. Using the fact that their values should
be perfectly anticorrelated, they can use the resulting OAM quantum number on Alice’s
side (or, equally, on Bob’s) to define a key. Since Lˆ and Sˆ measurements don’t affect each
other, the spin eigenvalues along each axis remain undetermined and the polarization
state remains entangled.
• Alternatively, if both measure jz , the key can then be defined by the resulting
TAM quantum number on Alice’s side. The spin components are again undetermined,
and the polarization state remains entangled.
• But if one measures jz and the other measures lz, this completely fixes the spin
along the axis: sz = jz − lz. The spin wavefunction collapses from an entangled state
to a separable one. These trials are discarded.
In the first two cases, the spin states remain entangled after sorting, so tests on
the linear polarization should yield Bell violation. In the third case, when Alice and
Bob measure different variables, such a test should yield no violation, the spin having
been reduced to a classical quantity. The measurement of one variable (Jˆz or Lˆz)
reduces the original space of states for each particle to a two-dimensional subspace,
while measurement of the second variable further reduces each particle to one unique
state. Consequently, the two-photon pair goes from an entangled to a separable state.
If Eve attempts quantum nondemolition measurements to determine jz or lz, then
on half the retained trials she will measure the wrong variable (the one not measured
by Alice and Bob), thus fixing s and causing a detectable loss of Bell violation.
In this scheme, the beam splitter’s random choice between causing either a Jˆz
measurement or an Lˆz measurement replaces the usual random modulation between two
measurement bases for components of a single variable. All variables act in a completely
quantum manner, with the ”quantumness” comes from the fact that although Lˆ and
Sˆ commute with each other, neither commutes with Jˆ ; if jz and lz are both measured,
whether by the legitimate participants or by eavesdroppers, polarization entanglement
is destroyed.
Another equivalent way to view the situation, that makes the analogy to the Ekert
case clearer, is that measurements can be made along a basis in angular momentum space
aligned with the Jˆz axis or one aligned with the Lˆz axis; these are mutually unbiased on
each two-dimensional subspace defined by a fixed jz value or a fixed lz value, but are also
incomplete in the sense that neither measurement fully determines the state. However
making both measurements does uniquely determine the state, completely fixing jz , lz,
and sz values.
Note that the key-generating capacity grows with increasing dimension, as is the
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Figure 4. A more detailed view of Alice’s lab; Bob’s lab has a similar arrangement.
After sorting in one variable (either jz or lz), information about the other variable then
needs to be erased (figure 2) before polarization interference is measured. The outgoing
arrows lead to systems for polarization measurement. For the top three outputs in the
figure, which particular detector fires at the end will tell Alice the value of jz but will
give no information about lz; the opposite is true in the bottom three outputs. Thus
Alice will know the value of only one of these two variables.
case for all OAM-based QKD methods. However, unlike in other OAM-based schemes,
the security-checking remains essentially two-dimensional so that the level of security
grows more slowly with increasing dimension. This is the price that is paid for reducing
the complexity of generating practical high-dimensional keys. The secure key rate and
mutual information between participants will be examined in section 3 and the appendix.
2.4. Example
To be more concrete, consider an entangled two-photon input state of the form
|ψ〉 = |ψoam〉|ψspin〉 (8)
=
1√
2
l0∑
lz=−l0
|lz〉A| − lz〉B
(
|H〉A|V 〉B − |V 〉A|H〉B
)
. (9)
Such a state arises, for example, from type II down conversion after filtering to equalize
the probabilities of various l values. The linear and circular polarization states are
related by
|H〉 = 1√
2
(|sz = 1〉+ |sz = −1〉) = 1√
2
(|R〉+ |L〉) (10)
|V 〉 = i√
2
(|sz = 1〉 − |sz = −1〉) = i√
2
(|R〉 − |L〉) , (11)
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where R and L correspond to spin sz = +1 and sz = −1, respectively. So the two-
particle state |ψ〉 can be written in terms of joint OAM-spin states |l, s〉 as
|ψ〉 = − 1√
2
1∑
sz=−1
l0∑
lz=−l0
(−1)sz/2|lz, sz〉A| − lz,−sz〉B. (12)
If both experimenters measure the TAM with Alice obtaining value jz, then Bob will
obtain value −jz , reducing the state to
|ψ′〉 = −i√
2
(|jz − 1,+1〉A| − jz + 1,−1〉B
−|jz + 1,−1〉A| − jz − 1,+1〉B) . (13)
The first entry in each ket is the lz value, the second is sz. Note that lz and sz remain
indeterminate after the jz measurement since multiple combinations of lz and sz can add
up to the same jz. If lz is not measured in either branch at any point, then information
about it can be erased as in figure 2, in order to arrive at a maximally-entangled spin
wavefunction,
|ψspin〉 = − i√
2
(|R〉A|L〉B − |L〉A|R〉B) (14)
=
1√
2
(|H〉A|V 〉B − |V 〉A|H〉B) . (15)
Carrying out a Bell-type test on polarization after the jz-sorting then yields maximal
quantum-mechanical Bell violation. However, if in addition to the jz-sorting, the OAM
on Bob’s side is also measured (by Bob or by Eve), the state of equation (13) collapses
to either
i|jz − 1, 1〉A| − jz + 1,−1〉B (16)
(if Bob finds value lz = −jz + 1), or else to
− i|jz + 1,−1〉A| − jz − 1, 1〉B (17)
(if Bob’s value is lz = −jz − 1). Placing quarter-wave plates at the output, to convert
from circular to linear polarization, the state becomes either
i|jz − 1, H〉A| − jz + 1, V 〉B (18)
or
− i|jz + 1, V 〉A| − jz − 1, H〉B. (19)
Either way, it is now a separable state (both before and after the lz erasure) with definite
polarization for each photon, so no Bell violation occurs. If Alice and Bob measure lz
while Eve measures jz, a similar result follows.
When Eve guesses whether to measure Lˆz or Jˆz, half the time she guesses wrong and
causes collapse of the entangled polarization state into a separable state. This lowers
the interference pattern’s visibility to classical levels when Bell tests are performed,
providing a clear signal of her intervention.
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To examine the interference visibility, define the rotated polarization states at
Alice’s location:
|θ〉A = cos θ|H〉A + sin θ|V 〉A (20)
|θ⊥〉A = − sin θ|H〉A + cos θ|V 〉A, (21)
with similar states |φ〉B and |φ⊥〉B defined at Bob’s lab. θ and φ are the angles
of linear polarizers before Alice’s and Bob’s detectors, respectively. In the absence
of eavesdropping, it is straightforward to verify that under ideal conditions (perfect
detectors and no losses) the coincidence rate is proportional to
|〈ψspin|θ〉A|φ〉B|2 = 1
2
sin2(θ − φ) = 1
2
[
1− cos2(θ − φ)] (22)
for the two-photon entangled spin state of equation (15). A Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH)-type interference experiment [34] will then exhibit oscillations with
visibility V of 100%. On the other hand, if |ψspin〉 is replaced by any separable state of the
form |ψsep〉 = |γ〉A|γ⊥〉B (where γ is the polarization direction of the photon measured
by Alice), the corresponding inner product is |〈ψsep|θ〉A|φ〉B|2 = cos2(γ − θ) sin2(γ − φ);
the dependences on θ and φ now factor so that the visibility can never be greater than
the classical limit of 1√
2
≈ 71%. In general, if Eve is eavesdropping a fraction η of the
time, the visibility will be V ≤ 1 −
(
1− 1√
2
)
η. A drop in visibility to below the value
set by the Bell-CHSH inequality signals the possible presence of eavesdropping.
3. Information and security considerations
Instead of testing Bell inequalities on the entangled polarization states, there is a second
way to check the security of the transmission, which will be more useful for arriving
at quantitative estimates of information and signalling rates. On the set of trials for
which Alice and Bob measure the same variable, they can choose a random subset of
their measurement values (lz or jz values) for comparison. Ideally, they should both find
perfectly anticorrelated values, so that the presence of discrepancies beyond the expected
error rate due to the transmission method then serves as a signal of an eavesdropper’s
presence. This method is more directly analogous to that of the BB84 scheme, requiring
no active modulation of the detector settings, as opposed to the Bell-inequality-based
version of the Ekert scheme, which still requires modulation of the settings for the
polarization measurements. In this section, we take the BB84-like approach when we
look at security considerations, since it is relatively easy to compute the probabilities of
the output states and the key rate while taking Eve’s actions into account.
If the allowed OAM values are {−l0, . . . , 0, . . . ,+l0}, then the possible jz values
are {−l0 − 1, . . . , 0, . . . , l0 + 1}. It should be noted that unlike the case of the Ekert or
BB84 protocols, where there is a finite number of possible outcomes (two polarizations)
and they are both used, in the current case we make use of a finite subset of a larger (in
fact infinite) set of possible output values for jz or lz. As a result, when Eve interferes it
is possible to ”run off the end” of the allowed set of values, and this possibility must be
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Figure 5. Comparison of the error rate e for the scheme described in this paper (solid
curves) to the BB84 protocol (dashed lines). This is done for (from top to bottom)
eavesdropping ratios η = 1, η = .5, and η = .1. In each case, the error rate for the
current approach starts a little below the BB84 value for small l0, but approaches it
rapidly and asymptotically as l0 increases.
accounted for. Also, we note that there are 2l0+3 values of jz but only 2l0+1 values of
lz. As a result of these complications some further refinements to the method must be
made. These are discussed in the appendix. The appendix also then gives the resulting
probability distributions for Alice’s and Bob’s joint outcomes. In this section, we make
use of those distributions to investigate the quantum security of the procedure against
eavesdropping.
3.1. Error rates
If Eve intercepts fraction η of the transmissions, she has 50% chance of measuring the
correct variable each time, obtaining the correct key value k (either from an Lˆz or Jˆz
measurement) without introducing errors. On the other hand, during the 50% of the
times in which she measures the wrong variable, she only has a further 50% chance of
sending the correct value to Bob. Specifically, each time she measures the wrong variable
her intervention has probability 1
8
of causing Bob to measure the value k−2 and overall
probability 1
8
of causing him to measure the value k + 2, with only probability 1
2
of
obtaining the correct key value, k (see figure A1). So if the alphabet size were infinite,
the eavesdropper-induced error rate would be e = η · (1
2
) · (1
2
)
= η
4
. However, we
must take into account the fact that Eve’s actions can cause values to move out of the
range being used for the key; this will alter the error rate slightly. Using the probability
distribution PAB given in the appendix, it is then straightforward to show that the true
eavesdropper-induced error rate is
e =
η
8
(
4l0 + 1
(2l0 + 1)− η8
)
. (23)
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Bob’s error rate is shown in figure 5 for three different eavesdropping ratios, along with
the corresponding values for polarization-based BB84. It is seen that for small l0 the
error rate is slightly lower than the BB84 value, but it rapidly approaches that value as
l0 increases.
After dropping the trials on which Alice and Bob measure different variables, the
fraction f of the remaining photons that are used to generate the key may also be easily
computed from PAB. It is found to be
f =
4l0 + 2− η
4l0 + 3
. (24)
This approaches 100% for l0 → ∞. For finite l0, it ranges between a low of f = 4l0+14l0+3
(for η = 1) and a high of f = 4l0+2
4l0+3
(for η = 0). For the worst case (l0 = 1 qutrits), this
corresponds to a range of 5
7
to 6
7
.
3.2. Mutual information and key rates
One may also compute the mutual information between the legitimate agents, I(A;B),
and information gain of the eavesdropper, IE = max {I(A;E), I(B;E)}. From these, the
secret key rate, κ = max {IAB − IE, 0} may be found. Recall that it is always possible
to distill a secret key using privacy amplification when κ > 0. Instead of the distribution
PAB given in the appendix (which includes all events, even those for which the values
run off the edge of the alphabet and so generate no key) in order to compute κ, we must
use the probability distribution PK(A,B) for the key-generating events only. This new
distribution is obtained from PAB simply by dropping its last row and column, then
dividing by the key-generating fraction f in order to renormalize the total probability
to unity. Straightforward calculation then gives the result that the mutual information
[35] between Alice and Bob as a function of parameters η and l0 is:
I(A;B) =
2
4l0 + 2− η
{(
2l0 + 1− η
2
)
log2
(
4l0 + 2− η
2
)
(25)
− 8
(
1− η
8
)
log2
(
1− η
8
)
+ (2l0 + 1)
(
1− η
4
)
log2
(
1− η
4
)
+
η
4
(2l0 − 1) log2
η
8
}
Asymptotically (for l0 →∞) this approaches log2(2l0), independent of η; for finite l0 and
no eavesdropping (η = 0), it is equal to log2(2l0 + 1). Eve gains full information about
the key value on half of the measurements she makes and receives none on the other half,
so the information gained by Eve is simply η
2
times the information per photon. The
results for the information and the secret key rate are plotted in figure 6(b-d). The case
of BB84 is shown for comparison in figure 6 (a). It is seen that κ is always greater than
in the BB84 case, that it remains positive for all values of η, and that for any fixed value
of η the value of κ increases with increasing l0. Thus, the amount of key generated per
transmitted photon is significantly larger than in the BB84 or Ekert schemes. Security
can be further enhanced in various ways, such as replacing the four-state polarization
scheme with a six-state approach [36].
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(a) (b)
I(A;B)
(c) (d)
Figure 6. Mutual information between Alice and Bob I(A;B) (dotted red curve) and
information gain by Eve IE (dashed black) for (b) l0 = 1, (c) l0 = 3, and (d) l0 = 5.
The secret key rate κ (solid blue) is either the difference IAB− IAE , or zero, whichever
is larger. As long as κ > 0, a secret key can always be distilled. For comparison, the
same quantities are plotted for the polarization-based Ekert protocol (or equivalently,
for the BB84 protocol) in (a). (Note the change in scale on the vertical axes of the
different plots.)
4. Conclusion
We have proposed a method for performing QKD using high-dimensional OAM and
TAM variables in a manner that does not require the complicated high-dimensional
basis modulations necessary in other approaches, and which allows an increase in
the rate of secure key distribution. The main ingredients are: (i) A hyperentangled
system with different functions segregated into different entangled degrees of freedom.
(ii) Random switching between two OAM bases is replaced by random switching
between measurements of two distinct noncommuting but related variables, Lˆz and
Jˆz. (iii) Measurement of any one variable does not completely determine the state,
while measurement of any two of the three relevant variables does. Together, these
ingredients allow the high capacity of Jˆz or Lˆz eigenstates to be used while modulating
only the simpler polarization states. As a result, higher-dimensional OAM spaces can
be utilized and higher key-generation capacities can be achieved with only relatively
minimal increases in apparatus complexity.
Previous approaches to using polarization and OAM together simply used them to
generate larger keys from each photon by increasing the number of variables involved.
In these past approaches, the variables still remained separate, with no interplay
between them. QND measurements on one variable left no signature in the other,
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so that both must experience independent basis modulations to maintain security. In
contrast, the approach described here makes a more fundamental use of the system’s
hyperentanglement, constructing a chain of three variables such that adjacent pairs
in the chain do not commute. This noncommutativity provides a linkage between the
variables that enhances security, as well as increasing the number of key bits per photon.
The approach of constructing chains of pairwise noncommuting operators has not
been previously used in QKD and is likely to be generalizable to other operators (aside
from angular momentum), and to employment in other types of quantum protocols as
well. The procedure also makes use of an angular momentum erasure process that is
of interest in its own right, since it allows the possibility of conducting future quantum
erasure or delayed choice experiments in angular momentum space.
At high l0, the eavesdropper-induced error rate is lower than for other two-basis
OAM-based QKD schemes, where e = η
2
(
1− 1
2l0+1
)
= η l0
2l0+1
; in the current scheme e
instead remains near the 2-dimensional BB84 error rate; this is because the eigenspaces
of the two measured operators (Jˆz and Lˆz) are effectively unbiased only on a two-
dimensional subspace, due to the two-dimensional nature of the polarization. The
dimension of the subspace on which the variables are unbiased does not increase with
l0. Because of this, the secret key rate κ will be lower than for other OAM-based
schemes at large l0. However, κ in this approach is always higher than in BB84 or E91
protocols even for the least advantageous case (l0 = 1), and it grows logarithmically
with increasing l0; similarly, the BB84-level eavesdropper-induced error rate remains
sufficient to detect eavesdropping regardless of dimension.
There are some technical difficulties that must be overcome for the method to
become practical. Probably the chief among these is that the most common method
of measuring photon OAM is to shift the input l-state to l = 0 and then to collect
them in an optical fiber. This method is of low efficiency, which greatly reduces the key
transmission rate of all OAM-based schemes. Further, the interferometers used to sort
the OAM and TAM values [33] become progressively more complex as the range of lz
and jz values to be used increases.
However, when coupled to the much greater ease in this scheme of switching between
Jˆz and Lˆz measurements compared to the difficult switching between measurements of
different components of Lˆ in other protocols, the method presented here seems to hold
strong promise as a more practical way to reach higher key rates per photon while
maintaining full quantum-level security.
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Appendix A. Outcome Probabilities
As mentioned in section 3, we must make adjustments to the protocol in order to
equalize the probabilities of the allowed key values, and must take into account that the
values measured may lie outside the range used for key generation. We deal with those
complications here, and give the joint probability distributions that result after doing
so.
Appendix A.1. Undisturbed probability distributions
First, the key must have the same range of values regardless of which variable was
measured. So assign no key value when jz = ±(l0 + 1) is measured; for the remaining
jz values, assign key value jz . Then either type measurement leads to a range of values
from −l0 to l0, leading to alphabet size N = 2l0+1. Instances where jz equals l0− 1 or
l0 + 1, though not used for key generation, are not discarded; they are recorded for use
in the security analysis. Second, all key values must have equal probability. Initially,
each lz value has probability PL(lz) =
1
2(2l0+1)
(the 1
2
comes from the probability that
lz was measured instead of jz), while each jz used for key generation has probability
PJ(jz) =
1
2(2l0+2)
. (The two values not used for key generation each have probability
1
4(2l0+3)
.) To make PL(k) = PJ(k) for each key value k, the reflectance of the beam
splitter may be adjusted away from 50%, so the reflection and transmission probabilities
are |r|2 = 1
2
− ǫ and |t|2 = 1
2
+ ǫ, with ǫ = 1
2
(
1
4l0+3
)
. Then each lz and jz value has
probability
PL(lz) = PJ(jz) =
1
4l0 + 3
, (A.1)
and each possible key value has probability
P (k) = PL(k) + PJ(k) =
2
4l0 + 3
, (A.2)
with probability 1
4l0+3
that no key is generated.
In Eve’s absence, there is ideally perfect anticorrelation when Alice and Bob
measure the same variable. The distributions of key values k should be identical,
PA(k) = PB(k). Moreover, their joint distribution should be uniform on the diagonal
and vanishing elsewhere:
P0(kA, kB) =
(
2
4l0 + 3
)
δkAkB . (A.3)
We therefore find entropies H(A) = H(B) = H(A,B) = log2(4l0 + 3) −
(4l0 + 2) / (4l0 + 3) , so the mutual information I(A;B) ≡ H(A) + H(B) − H(A,B)
just equals the Shannon information of each participant separately, I = log2(4l0 + 3)−
(4l0 + 2) / (4l0 + 3) .
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Figure A1. The possible outcomes when Eve intervenes, assuming Alice and Bob
both measure Lˆz. (If they measure Jˆz instead, swap the variables l and j everywhere
in the figure.) At each splitting, each branch has equal probability. Circles containing
the letters A, B, or E represent measurements by Alice, Bob, or Eve, respectively.
Appendix A.2. Probability distributions with eavesdropping
The effects of Eve’s actions are shown in figure A1. (The figure assumes that Alice
and Bob measure Lˆz; if they measure Jˆz, simply interchange lz and jz everywhere in
the figure.) At each splitting of branches, there is a 50% chance that each branch will
be taken. Suppose Alice measures Lˆz and obtains value −lA. If Eve intercepts the
transmission, she may measure the same variable, in which case both she and Bob will
obtain the negative of Alice’s value: lE = +lA for Eve and lB = +lA for Bob. But if Eve
measures the other variable, Jˆz, then she has equal likelihood of measuring the value
above lA or the value below it: jE = lA+1 or jE = lA−1. Similarly, Bob then has equal
chances of measuring Lˆz to have the eigenvalue one unit above or below Eve’s value:
lB = jE ± 1.
As a result, the entries of the matrix representing the undisturbed joint probability
distribution,
P0(kA, kB) =
(
2
4l0 + 3
)
δkAkB (A.4)
are now smeared out by Eve’s actions over multiple entries in Bob’s direction.
Using the diagram of figure A1, the new Alice-Bob joint probability distribution on
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trials where Eve intervenes may be determined. It is found to be
P1 =
2
4l0 + 3


3
4
0 1
8
0 . . . 0 1
8
0 3
4
0 1
8
1
8
1
8
0 3
4
0 1
8
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
1
8
0 3
4
1
8
. . . 0 0 1
16
0 7
16


, (A.5)
where rows label Alice’s outcomes and columns label Bob’s. The first 2l0 + 1 rows and
columns label possible key values, while the last row and column correspond to Alice
or Bob, respectively, generating no key. For eavesdropping fraction η, the full joint
outcome distribution for all trials becomes
PAB(k) = (1− η)P0 + ηP1, (A.6)
with marginal probabilities for the two participants obtained by summing rows and
columns.
The eavesdropper-induced error rate, the mutual information shared by Alice and
Bob, and the secure key rate may all now be found using this distribution. These
quantities are discussed in section 3.
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